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Abstract 
This article analyzes, empirically, the link between public procurement and innovation activities by taking into account 
the moderating effect played by import penetration on public procurement. Using industry-level information on patent 
applications for 24 countries over the period 1995-2012, we test the impact of public procurement on innovation 
activities and whether and in which direction import penetration on public procurement impacts on patenting. The 
econometric analysis relies on Poisson regression techniques aiming to investigate the correlation between patent 
counts, supply as well as demand-side determinants, controlling for country and sector heterogeneity. The obtained 
results confirm our main hypotheses. The dynamics of patenting is positively affected by the public procurement while 
a high degree of import penetration reduces the innovation enhancing effect exerted by public demand. Our results 
suggest that public demand may represent an effective tool for industrial policy to stimulate innovative activities, to 
shape the transformation of production systems and to foster industrial renewal. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
shows that the strategy regarding the degree of openness in public procurement towards non-domestic firms is a crucial 
policy choice capable of affecting the innovative potential of public demand.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The term 'public procurement' (PP, hereafter) is used to identify the direct purchase of goods and 
services by the public sector. In 2015, PP accounted for a share of about 12% of the OECD 
countries’ GDP and almost 30% of their national public spending.1  
PP has been used as a policy instrument in pursuit of different goals: increasing aggregate demand, 
stimulating production and job creation, protecting domestic companies from global competition by 
encouraging investment and growth, increasing competitiveness of  ‘national champions’ by 
fostering their innovative capacity and, finally, reducing regional disparities (Edquist and Hommen, 
2000). No less significantly, PP is a key industrial and innovation policy tool. In fact, it can 
accelerate productive system upgrade, encouraging the development of sectors characterized by 
greater technological intensity, creating new markets and stimulating demand-driven innovative 
investments (Rothwell, 1983; Weiss and Thurbon, 2006; Chang, 1994; Gerosky, 1990; Wade, 1990; 
Edquist et al. 2000, Mazzucato, 2013).  
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to demand-side policies to foster innovation 
(Edler and Gheorghiou, 2007; OECD, 2011; Gheorghiou et al. 2014) and PP has been identified as 
a key instrument of innovation policy in both the developed and developing countries (Uyarra and 
Flanagan, 2010; Crespi and Quatraro, 2013; Mazzucato et al. 2015; Edquist, 2015). The key role of 
PP appears to be particularly important in the current economic situation. The 2008 crisis has led to 
a sharp decline in levels of economic activity and employment, especially in the manufacturing 
sectors. In Europe, the crisis has led to growing polarization in terms of employment, 
competitiveness and industrial specialization (Simonazzi et al., 2013, Cirillo and Guarascio, 2015; 
Lucchese et al., 2016; Andreoni and Chang, 2016). In this scenario, PP is seen as a useful tool to 
reverse the economic trend characterizing the majority of EU economies (Mazzucato et al. 2015). 
Public demand for goods and services could play a crucial role in macroeconomic terms, supporting 
aggregate demand and employment, but also reviving those innovative investments that are 
essential for sustaining industrial renewal, international competitiveness and economic growth in 
the long run (Chang and Andreoni, 2016). Moreover, orienting public demand towards specific 
areas and firms can help to strengthen the regions and sectors more seriously harmed by the crisis.   
Directing public demand towards one or more specific production sectors represents a relevant 
strategy to promote the emergence or consolidation of production and markets characterized by 
																																								 																				
1	 Source: OECD - Government at a glance 2015 database (http://www.oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-2015-
database.htm)	
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high growth prospects (Pasinetti, 1981; Pianta, 2015; Mazzucato, 2016). This appears to be of 
particular relevance in high-tech industries, where returns on R&D investment are particularly 
uncertain. Thus, public procurement can produce an exogenous increase in demand for high-tech 
goods and services, stimulating innovation activities to capture these demand flows (Leon, 1966; 
Pasinetti, 1981). 
After the crisis, however, not all countries followed the same strategy. The United States included 
public procurement among their main countercyclical tools. Public investments have been directed 
towards upgrading the infrastructure network as well as fostering high-tech and green sectors 
(Wade, 2017). Moreover, the US has sought to maximize the impact of its government spending 
with a strategy focused on domestic purchase of products (the so-called ‘Buy American’ strategy 
compelling the government to purchase only domestically produced goods and services). By 
contrast, the EU responded to the crisis adopting deflationary policies designed to consolidate 
member states’ public budgets. For these reasons, many European countries have seen a reduction 
rather than increase in the scale of public procurement. Furthermore, the EU institutions in no way 
encouraged increase in the domestic content of public procurement (i.e. no measures like the ‘Buy 
American’ have been adopted in Europe). 
The aim of this work is to analyze the relevance of the demand-pull influence of PP on innovation 
activities at the sectoral level. Moreover, by means of panel data econometrics we investigate 
whether, and if so to what extent, import penetration of public procurement exerts a moderating 
effect in shaping the relationship between PP and the innovative activities of industries. In so doing, 
we will try to shed light on a possible trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency that should 
be taken into account in policy choices regarding PP strategies. The analysis draws upon a rich 
dataset providing industry-level information on economic performance, public procurement, 
international trade and production as well as R&D expenditure and patents for all manufacturing 
industries – 2-digits Nace Rev. 1 – in 24 countries over the period 1995-2011.2 In particular, sector 
level information on PP is derived from the WIOD database, which collects Input/Output tables for 
a large set of countries.3  
The article is organized as follows. In the next Section, we review the relevant literature and spell 
out the research questions that we address in the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the database 
adopted and construction of variables; and traces out a descriptive picture of the dynamics of PP 
through time and import penetration in the EU and in the major OECD economies. Model, 
																																								 																				
2	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey and the US.	
3	Input/Output data represent the best available approximation in standard statistics to obtain a sector based breakdown 
of government procurement (Ramboll, 2009; Appelt and Galindo-Rueda, 2016).	
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econometric strategy and results are presented and discussed in Section 4; while Section 5 
concludes providing some general remarks. 
2. Literature background 
 
The demand pull effect of Public Procurement on innovative activities 
The role of demand-side factors has traditionally been underestimated in both economic theory and 
government policy, which largely focussed on supply-side factors enhancing innovation, as if 
markets were always capable of passively absorbing the innovations introduced (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007). However, demand conditions have been shown to crucially influence the 
desirability and realization of inventions, while expected profitability resulting from the expansion 
of market demand represents the key stimulus to which inventive activities tend to respond (Kaldor, 
1957; Schmookler, 1966; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 1990). In this 
respect, previous empirical evidence showed that there was a positive relationship between demand 
and R&D investments (Kleinknecht, 1996) and that innovations tend to show a pro-cyclic 
behaviour, with demand “Granger causing” innovation (Gerosky and Walters, 1995). According to 
Gerosky and Walters (1995), the economic explanation of this phenomenon is twofold. Firstly, 
markets have a limited ability to absorb new products in a given period. When demand expands, 
this capacity tends to grow, making the introduction of innovation more profitable. On the other 
hand, appropriability problems are involved in innovative activities, and the time firms have to 
profit from innovation is often limited. Thus, innovations are more likely to appear in periods 
characterised by a growing demand trend. 
From a different perspective, user-producer interactions have been recognised as a further source of 
demand-pull effect on innovation (Von Hippel, 1986). Buyers can anticipate market demand by 
becoming early adopters and lead users, stimulating innovative activities for continuous 
improvement of both product and services. In so doing, they get involved in the innovation process 
and eventually become co-producers of user-driven innovations (Bresnahan, 2001; Malerba, 2007). 
As amply demonstrated by early contributions (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Rothwell and 
Zegveld, 1981), PP can exert a significant influence on innovation activities with respect to all these 
channels (Cave and Frinking, 2003; Cabral et al. 2006), whether or not stimulation of innovations is 
an explicit goal of procurement activities pursued by governments (Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). On 
the one hand, considering that (regular) PP accounts for a good part of the overall demand for goods 
and services, it can play a key role in enlarging the market for new goods and services, thus 
providing an incentive to invest in innovation. Public demand can create or consolidate a market, 
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thus reducing uncertainty, favouring the development of a critical mass encouraging R&D 
investment and enabling dynamic increasing returns, especially in industries characterised by 
appreciable economies of scale, substantial R&D sunk costs and high levels of uncertainty (see for 
instance Kaldor, 1981; Malerba, 2007; Chang and Andreoni, 2017). On the other hand, when 
innovation becomes an explicit goal of public procurement, as in the case of innovative 
procurement, public organisations can influence innovation directly by purchasing new goods and 
services. In this case, the public sector uses its own demand/need or acts as a catalyst for needs 
located outside the public agency specifically to induce innovation, often becoming a lead user and 
co-creator through user-producer interactions (Edquist et al. 2015).   
While the literature has so far examined these issues mainly through qualitative (case-based) 
analyses or (more rarely) micro-level quantitative studies, the present paper aims, in the first place, 
to provide a large-scale empirical assessment of the role of PP in shaping innovation activities at the 
sectoral level for a large set of countries. In so doing, we are not able to distinguish between regular 
and innovative PP. However, we put forth a first (but still rough) attempt to empirically distinguish 
between the two PP types by using an ad-hoc PP innovation propensity index beside the standard 
PP indicator (in what follows, we provide a detailed of PP indicators adopted for the analysis).   
The role of import penetration 
The effectiveness of PP in spurring innovation activities also depends on the specific strategies that 
countries adopt regarding PP. Strategies concerning the degree of market openness can be of major 
importance, since if part of domestic public demand is intercepted by other countries’ economies, 
the impact of public procurement on the internal production structure could be reduced. In this 
respect, procurement and innovation occur in space and the impacts of procurement on national 
(local) systems of innovation crucially depend on the spatial patterns of government procurement, 
on the degree of control over purchasing by the local and regional authorities, and on the extent to 
which benefits can be retained within a specific economic area through production linkages and 
knowledge spillovers (Porter, 1990; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010).  
Moreover, by giving preferential treatment to domestic firms in PP, governments can substantially 
reduce demand uncertainty and increase incentives to pursue innovative investment, as for instance 
was the case of the US aircraft industry, the Japanese mainframe computer industry, and the Finnish 
electronics industry (Chang and Andreoni, 2016). Finally, as preferentially acting on the 
proportions of local demand, PP can favour the role of increasing returns and learning effects in the 
generation of new knowledge, both within and outside individual firms (Arrow, 1962; Kaldor, 
1966; Antonelli, 1999; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014; Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2014). 
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These aspects appear to be of particular relevance if there are different degrees of international 
contestability of public demand in the various countries and for economies seriously distressed, as 
in the case of the EU periphery after the crisis (recall that countries like Italy and Spain lost around 
20% of their manufacturing productive capacity between 2008 and 2013).  For these reasons, when 
PP is used as an instrument of industrial policy to promote industrial renewal and the development 
of certain areas and technologies, types of enterprises - i.e. small and medium-sized enterprises - or 
specific geographic areas, governments tend to favor local companies so as to maximize the impact 
of public demand (see for instance Miyagiwa, 1991; Cohen, 2007; Peneder, 2017). 
Policies aiming at ensuring the effectiveness of PP – from both the demand- and the supply-side 
perspective – can be considered policies of ‘discriminatory procurement’. The discrimination occurs 
when governments uses PP to encourage local producers. Such discrimination may be explicit, as in 
the case of the "Buy American" clause in the US - the public purchase of foreign goods is in some 
cases avoided – or implicit, using price discrimination or taxes. Discrimination typically occurs, 
however, through tacit agreements between local producers and governments realized by 
contracting the time of publicizing the tender or imposing technical specifications favoring local 
producers (Lowinger 1976; Beviglia-Zampetti 1997, Kono and Rickard, 2014). From an economic 
point of view, protecting local companies by means of a discriminatory use of public procurement 
constitutes a barrier to international trade and is equivalent to imposing import restrictions (Brulhart 
and Trionfetti 2004; Trionfetti 2000). Historically, this tool has been widely used to protect 
domestic industry and promote the growth of the so-called ‘national champions’ (Cohen, 2007; 
Weiss and Thurbon, 2011). 
It is worth noting the difference in the attitudes of the US and the EU towards the use of public 
procurement. The US, in fact, has always maintained a very extensive and stringent set of rules 
protecting the American market of public procurement while promoting American businesses 
(Wade, 2017). Ever since the Buy American Act of 1933, in fact, the US government has identified 
a core of public purchasing programs in which the federal government and national agencies are 
obliged to facilitate the purchase of goods and services produced locally. On the contrary, EU 
policies on public procurement have been explicitly designed to prevent any discrimination likely to 
favor domestic producers. The principle behind this approach is that the increased competition 
among suppliers - due to the opening up to international competition - enables efficiency gains in 
the production system, greater efficiency in public spending and thus welfare gains for the EU as a 
whole (Weiss and Thurbon, 2011, Ramboll Report, 2011). This attitude raises some concern 
because, on the one hand, the EU does not seem to be having much success in its ambition to open 
up the global market for public procurement significantly while, on the other hand, European 
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companies appear to be penalized by different access rules on foreign markets of public 
procurement (Ramboll Report, 2011, European Commission, 2011). 
Building on this argument the present paper seeks to test the hypothesis that import penetration of 
PP affects the relationship between public demand and industry innovativeness by reducing the 
potential of demand-pull effects of public procurement in triggering innovation activities and 
spurring industrial renewal. 
3. Data and descriptive evidence 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out over a panel of manufacturing industries for 24 countries 
observed over the period 1995-2012. The dataset provides a combination of Input-Output data on 
PP and of industry-level information on patents. Adopting the procedure proposed by Lybbert and 
Zolas (2014), we first derive information on patents in each industry for all the countries considered 
across the entire timespan selected (details on the procedure adopted to build the dataset are 
supplied below and in the Appendix).4 Secondly, we rely on the World Input Output Database 
(WIOD) to build industry-level variables on PP, import penetration on PP and exports (Timmer et 
al. 2015). Thirdly, we use data on R&D expenditure drawn from the OECD ANBERD database to 
control for industries’ investment in innovation activities.  
Industries’ innovative dynamics is captured by the sector performance on patents5. Since 
information on industries’ patenting activities is not generally available, an imputation procedure to 
break country-level information down to the industry-level is needed. In this respect, significant 
advances have been made thanks to the imputation technique recently elaborated by Lybbert and 
Zolas (2014).6 We follow their approach7, obtaining a 15-year-long panel of industries’ patenting 
activities. Moreover, we compute patent stock using a standard inventory methods accounting for 
																																								 																				
4	Patent data refer to European Patent Office (EPO) applications carried out by the considered countries between 1995 
and 2009.	
5	We recognize that the use of patent data presents several drawbacks: among others, the distribution of patents across 
firms and sectors is highly skewed, there is a large variance in patent quality and, most importantly, only a fraction of 
innovations is patented (Griliches, 1990; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). However, in order to build a sufficiently long 
panel data set on innovation performance of industries we believe this was the best available option. 
6	As Lybbert and Zolas (2014) point out, “While patent data often serve as useful proxies for technological change and 
diffusion, fully exploiting patent data in economic analyses would require that patents be linked to economic activity at 
a level of disaggregation that allows for different technological, industrial and spatial patterns. Such a detailed link 
between technological and economic activity would further improve our assessment of policies that aim to promote 
innovation, as well as assess the relationship between technological change and economic development” (pp. 530). In 
light of this, further attempts for industry-level linkages that associate patents and economic data based on the domain 
of goods and services they represent is strongly required for enrich the economic analysis	
7	The	Lybbert and Zolas (2014)’s imputation procedure is based on an Algorithmic Links with Probabilities (ALP) 
applied to patents’ content descriptions. Focusing on the correspondence between patent contents and sectors 
characteristics this procedure allows matching, with a significant level of precision, patents identified according to the 
IPC classification; and  2-digit industries.	
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the depreciation of the knowledge-stock (see the Appendix for illustration of the methodology 
adopted). Once patents are assigned to industrial sectors according to the methodology of Lybbert 
and Zolas (2014), the three data sources - namely the WIOD, the OECD ANBERD and the EPO 
patent database - are merged together. To this end, the ISIC classification in accordance with the 
NACE information is used to match patents with PP, import penetration, export and R&D data. In 
table 1, we provide the list of variables included in the analysis.   
Table 1. List of variables and sources 
Variable Unit Source 
Patents filed at the EPO  Absolute value	 EPO 
Public procurement (PP) Millions of euros (real values)	 WIOD 
Innovative PP propensity index Millions of euros (real values) WIOD and EUROSTAT 
Import penetration on public 
procurement 
Share	 WIOD 
Export over value added Share WIOD 
R&D expenditure   Thousands of euros (real values)	 ANBERD  
    
The variable capturing industry-level PP is computed as the sum of goods and services - both 
intermediate and final – purchased by the public sector from each 2-digit industry. In so doing, we 
follow the strategy adopted by Messerlin and Mirodout (2012). We add to the information on 
government expenditure on goods and services the purchases made by the following industries: 
‘electricity, gas and water supply’ (100%), ‘post and telecommunications’ (50%), ‘public 
administrations and defence, compulsory social security’ (100%), ‘education’ (100%) and ‘health 
and social work’ (100%). Therefore, for each sector i, country j and year t, the PP variable gives the 
value of goods and services purchased by the government of the country concerned j from that 
sector i (see equation 2 below).  
As argued in the literature background section, and at length by Edquist (2015), the PP pro-
innovative stance may vary considerably according to the ‘type’ of PP taken into consideration. In 
particular, it is worth distinguishing between regular and innovation-related PP, with the latter in 
the sense of government purchases of goods and services that explicitly promote innovation. 
Edquist (2015: p.6) refers to ‘regular PP’ as “the purchase of pens, paper, towels, trains, 
telecommunication services, cars, etc.”. In these cases, “innovations may occur spontaneously”. On 
the contrary, innovation-related PP, in turn, concerns government purchases of goods and services 
that do not exist at the time of the order.  
Though we do not have specific information on innovative PP, in order to capture the potential 
different propensity of governments toward innovation procurement, we build an indicator – i.e. the 
innovative PP propensity index – by weighting information on sectoral PP by the country-level 
share of public expenditure devoted to R&D, as reported by Eurostat. Albeit simple, this indicator 
allows for combination of, on one hand, data on the relevance and dynamics of PP in each sector 
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and country, and, on the other, information on the priority each government attributes to innovation. 
Relying on this indicator, we test whether, and if so to what extent, the PP demand-pull effect is 
affected by governments’ innovation propensity. Formally, the innovation PP propensity index can 
be represented as follows (1): 
 𝐼𝑃𝑃!"# = 𝐺!"# +   𝐺!!"#$!"#  ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑆𝐻!" (1)	
	
where, for each sector-country-year triple, the innovative PP index is equal to the sectoral PP – i.e. 
the sum of government purchases of final goods and services  from a certain sector i plus the sum of 
intermediate goods purchased from the same sector by the k industries (k=1,…,5) - weighted by the 
share of public expenditure for R&D activities out of the total.     
The variable identifying the degree of import penetration of PP is calculated as the share of 
(domestic) public procurement to sector j which is captured by foreign producers (Ramboll Report, 
2011; Messerlin and Mirodout, 2012). For instance, the share of import penetration of the Italian 
motor vehicle industry is equal to the share of government purchases of motor vehicles produced 
abroad in the total public procurement directed towards the motor vehicle industry. The same holds 
for all the manufacturing sectors of each country.  
The import penetration indicator (2) is computed as:    
 𝐼𝑚𝑝_ 𝑝𝑒𝑛!"# =  ( 𝐺!"#!!!,…,!;!!!! +  𝐺!"#!"#$!!!,…,!;!!!! )𝑇𝑜𝑡_𝑃𝑃!"#  (2)	
 
where, the numerator is the sum of intermediate and final goods imported by the government of 
country j from a certain sector i; the denominator is total public demand by the government of 
country j directed towards sector i – i.e. the first term on the RHS of equation (1). Hence, (2) 
measures how much PP – for each country j and sector i – directed towards a certain sector relies on 
foreign producers rather than on domestic ones. 
 
The dynamics of public procurement and import penetration 
As a preliminary step, we analyze the dynamics of PP and import penetration on PP between 1995 
and 2011. Over the considered time span, the share of PP on total aggregate demand increases in 
Europe, the US and Japan (figures 1 and 2).8 
																																								 																				
8	The time horizon coincides with the one used for the econometric analysis. In the descriptive analysis we include all 
EU27 economies while in the econometric one some EU countries are missing due to the lack of data on patents. The 
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Figure 1. Share of PP on total demand in EU27, EU3 (Ger, It and Fr) and USA 
 
Source: our elaboration on WIOD data 
 
However, some relevant elements of heterogeneity are detectable. During the 1995-2000 period, 
PP’ share declines in Europe (and in a more pronounced way in the EU3 aggregate including 
France, Germany and Italy); while it increases in Japan and, to a lower extent, in the US. Along the 
2000s, the EU27’s PP share lies above both the US and the Japanese one. Nevertheless, the 
explosion of the 2008 crisis coincides with a sharp drop of PP shares in all the considered countries 
with Japan being the only one showing a slight recovery after 2010.     
 
Figure 2. Share of public demand on total demand in EU27, EU3 (Ger, It and Fr) and Japan 
	
Source: our elaboration on WIOD data	
Moving to the dynamics of import penetration (figures 3-4), it emerges a watershed around the year 
2000. In all the economies taken into consideration, this year coincides with the start of a trend of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																								
EU3 aggregate includes Germany, France and Italy and is already used in Messerlin and Mirodout (2012) to investigate 
the dynamics of PP and import penetration on PP in Europe.	
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increasing import penetration on PP continuing until the crisis (and in the European case even 
afterwards). The discontinuity observed around the 2000 may be linked to the beginning of a phase 
during which the intensity of trade and production globalization skyrockets following, for example, 
events such as China joining the WTO. Comparatively, the US show the highest degree of import 
penetration with Europe remaining a little behind. The degree of import penetration on PP, in turn, 
is significantly lower in Japan in the early 2000s but tends to converge to the US and EU27 levels 
around 2008. 
 
Figure 3. Import penetration on public procurement in EU27, EU3 (Ger, It and Fr) and USA 
1995-2011 
	
Source: our elaboration on WIOD data 
After 2008, the dynamics of import penetration on PP starts diverging. While the EU27 and the 
EU3 are continuing in a trend of increasing import penetration on public procurement, in the US 
there has been a sharp fall that stops, with a gradual recovery, towards the end of 2009. During the 
crisis, thus, the degree of openness of public procurement in Europe and in the US starts diverging 
substantially. This evidence can be associated with the effects of 'protectionist' measures – i.e. the 
‘Buy American’ act - aimed at protecting public procurement and put forth in the US early after the 
crisis explosion. A reinforced 'buy American' would seem to explain, at least in part, the sudden 
divergence in the dynamics of import penetration depicted in figure 4. 
A dynamics of divergence characterizes also the trend of import penetration observed in Japan as 
opposed to the EU27 and EU3 ones. The comparison between Europe and Japan shows that the 
latter lies well below the two EU aggregates for the whole period considered and, in particular, from 
the crisis onwards. This is possibly due, on the one hand, to the traditional introversion of the 
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Japanese economy, as testified also by the lower degree of import penetration characterizing the 
1995-2007 phase.9 
 
Figure 4. Import penetration on public procurement in EU27, EU3 (Ger, It and Fr) and Japan 
1995-2011 
 
Source: our elaboration on WIOD data 
 
Similarly to what has been shown concerning the US, on the other hand, the marked reduction of 
import penetration observable after 2008 can be due to the adoption of a ‘protectionist’ strategy put 
forth by the Japanese government as a response to the drop in aggregate demand following the 
crisis. 
Such descriptive evidence confirms the relevance of PP as a major component of effective demand 
and suggests that different strategies are adopted by different countries in terms of its openness 
degree to international markets. The following econometric analysis is then designed to identify the 
role of these variables in shaping industries’ innovation activities. 
 
4. Model, econometric strategy and results 
 
The model 
The relationship between PP and industries innovative dynamics and of the moderating role exerted 
by import penetration are investigated relying on the following econometric specification (3):  
 𝑃𝐴𝑇!"# =  𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑃!"#!! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑃!"#!! +  𝛽! ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝑃!!!"#!! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝑃!!"#$!! ∗ 𝑃𝑃!"#!! +  
																																								 																				
9	 The Japanese economy is characterized by a relatively lower propensity towards production outsourcing and 
offshoring as compared to the EU and the US. This element tends to relatively reduce the purchase of goods and 
services from abroad to meet public demand. 
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𝛽! ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝑃!!"#$!! ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑃!"#!! +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑋!"#!! +  𝜀!"#      (3) 
 
where i stands for sector, j for country and t for time. The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑇!"# is the patent 
stock – we considered the stock of patents at time t accounting for both new patents and 
depreciation of the knowledge stock. 𝑃𝑃!"#!! is the public procurement variable providing 
information on public procurement directed to each sector i at time t-1 while 𝐼𝑃𝑃!"#!! is the PP 
innovation propensity index described above. The degree of import penetration on PP is identified 
by 𝐼𝑀𝑃!!!"#!! and the latter is than interacted with both 𝑃𝑃!"#!! and 𝐼𝑃𝑃!"#!!. The term 𝑋!"#!!, in 
turn, includes a set of controls such as the lagged change in sectoral R&D expenditure and lagged 
export intensity – i.e. gross exports on sectoral value added - while 𝜀!"# is the standard error term.  
The coefficients β! and β! identify, respectively, the association between PP and the ‘innovation-
augmented’ PP indicator, on one hand, and the sectoral patent stock, on the other. Finally, β! and 𝛽! capture the (average) additional effect that import penetration has on the PP-innovation 
relationship. The use of lags has both theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, we 
argue that the potential effects of PP on industries’ innovation dynamics – as well as the effect of 
the other demand-pull (export intensity) and technology-push (change in R&D expenditure) 
elements included in (3) – come into operation only after a time lag. From a methodological 
standpoint, using lagged regressors mitigates the risk of simultaneity-related endogeneity. 
The specification in (3) constitutes an enhancement with respect to the previous models exploring 
the determinants of innovation in industries. In particular, we follow the contributions examining 
jointly the impact on industries’ innovative performance in technology-push and demand-pull 
factors – see, among the others, Crespi and Pianta (2007), Guarascio et al. (2015, 2016) and 
Guarascio and Pianta (2016), by adding variables that explicitly account for PP and import 
penetration of PP.  
The model builds on the hypothesis that aggregate demand and, particularly, PP are important 
drivers of technological change and innovation (Edquist, 2015; Mazzucato et al. 2015). Following 
the demand-pull perspective, innovation is developed when companies anticipate significant 
demand flows. According to this view, the introduction of innovations is supported by science-
related developments and is triggered by relative prices in a feasible production set. The magnitude 
of the demand-pull effect may, however, vary according to the type of demand flow faced by firms 
and industries. In particular, authors like Bogliacino et al. (2013) and Guarascio et al. (2016) 
identify exports as a crucial driver of product innovation in European industries. In Pasinetti (1981)’ 
work, in turn, the development of innovations is seen as embedded in a process of continuous 
changes of the industrial structure, fundamentally driven by demand.  
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Within this process, the generation of labour-enhancing process innovations – i.e. the kind of 
innovations that Pasinetti (1981) recognizes as fundamental to sustain employment and income 
growth by overcoming coordination problems between individual and collective choices – cannot 
be achieved without continuous and sustained demand flows. In this context, the nature of these 
demand flows – i.e. distinguishing between private, public, domestic demand or exports as well as 
between consumption and investments – and the technological characteristics of industries 
receiving such flows are of primary importance. As regards the first element, the powerful role of 
public demand – and, in particular, of PP – as innovation driver is repeatedly stressed by Mazzucato 
(2016), who argues that public investments are absolutely essential in forming and creating new 
technological opportunities and market landscapes.  
In this respect, the implementation of public investment programs designed to solve specific 
societal problems – i.e. societal challenges such as climate change, obesity, ageing, etc. – tend to 
mobilize knowledge-intensive lines of production, stimulating company innovation and generating 
economy-wide technological spillovers. On the other hand, orientation of public investments and 
PP towards high-tech sectors may strengthen such industries, reinforcing their economic and 
innovative dynamics with benefits unfolding throughout the economy. From this point of view, and 
in line with the arguments presented in Mazzucato (2016), PP represents a key (selective) industrial 
policy tool having among its major objectives the promotion of innovation and technological 
upgrading. Concerning the role of import penetration, the question is: does opening up PP to foreign 
competition affect the capacity of public demand to stimulate innovation? As already argued, we 
explore these relationships having the opportunity to test the latter, first considering the full set of 
countries under analysis, and secondly comparing the PP-import penetration-innovation nexus in 
Europe – PP being open to foreign competition both before and after the 2008 crisis – and in the US 
– where a restriction on foreign competition in PP, the ‘Buy American’ Act, was introduced as from 
2008.      
The key hypothesis tested by estimating the model in (3) can be summarized as follows. To begin 
with, we test whether PP is positively associated with industries’ patenting activities, controlling for 
both technology-push (R&D efforts) and demand-pull factors (export intensity). Second, we verify 
whether the relationship between PP and patents changes when PP is distinguished between a 
general measure and the PP innovation propensity index (see above for a description of the index). 
Third, we investigate whether, and if so to what extent, a relatively more intense import penetration 
of PP affects the relationship between the latter and industries’ innovativeness. Having analyzed the 
general relationships – i.e. estimating the model over the full sample of countries and industries 
included in the analysis -, we explore two different levels of heterogeneity. Focusing on country-
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level heterogeneity, we test whether the relations emerging from the full sample model vary, 
estimating the same model on European industries only. Turning, then, to the technological 
heterogeneity, we test whether the PP-import penetration-patents nexus changes when distinction is 
made between high and low-tech industries. 
 
Econometric strategy and results 
The use of patent data as proxies of the innovative activity implies that we have to deal with count 
variables, that is, variables with non-negative integer values. Econometric models specifically 
designed for this kind of variable are the Poisson Regression Model (PRM) and the Negative 
Binomial Regression Model (NBRM). Given the characteristics of our data and the limited number 
of zeros in our count variables, we analyse the relation between PP and industries patenting 
activities relying on the PRM.10 Poisson regression fits models of the number of occurrences 
(counts) of an event by assuming that the dependent variable has a Poisson distribution. Moreover, 
it assumes that the logarithm of its expected value can be modeled by a linear combination of 
unknown parameters. To control for industry-level heterogeneity, we exploit the panel structure of 
our data by implementing the Poisson fixed effects estimator.11 In this way, we limit the risk that 
the detected relationships are driven by industry or country-specific idiosyncratic elements. Finally, 
in order to soften potential endogeneity biases and ensure estimations consistency, we include all 
regressors at their first lag.  
All the estimations are performed adopting a stepwise procedure based on four different 
specifications. In the first specification, industries patents are regressed against the annual change 
(expressed as logarithmic difference) in R&D expenditure and export intensity (exports over value 
added) only. The second includes the lagged change in PP (logarithmic difference) testing the 
degree of correlation between patenting and public demand. The third specification includes both 
PP and PP innovation propensity index to check for potential heterogeneity between the two. 
Finally, we test the full specification having, on the right hand side, change in R&D expenditure, 
																																								 																				
10	This is the natural starting point for an analysis of count data but it may be biased by an excess in zeros and an 
overdispersion problem. In many applications, the model underestimates the probability of a zero count and low counts 
in general. In addition, the equidispersion assumption of the Poisson model, the equality of the conditional mean and the 
conditional variance is commonly violated. Real variables are often overdispersed, that is, the variance exceeds the 
mean. The major disadvantage in the presence of overdispersion is that estimates are inefficient with the standard errors 
biased downward, resulting in spuriously large z-values and small p-values (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). In these 
cases, the NBRM, which addresses the failure of the PRM by introducing unobserved heterogeneity across the Poisson 
means, could be used. In our case, however, the reduced number of zeros among the dependent variables observations 
of the dependent variable and the results of tests conducted to this purpose are in favor of the use of the PRM. 
11	The Poisson fixed effect estimator conditions the probability of the counts for each group on the sum of the counts for 
the group. The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the model parameters.	
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export intensity, PP, PP innovation propensity index, degree of import penetration and the 
interaction between the two PP indicators and the import penetration variable.  
Table 3 reports the result of the full sample model. Industries patenting activities show a significant 
association with both export intensity and R&D expenditure, testifying the joint action of 
technology-push and demand-pull factors as in Guarascio et al. (2016). The strongest result regard 
the PP-innovation nexus. Looking at sign and significance of the PP coefficients, it emerges that 
industries characterized by a relatively more intense PP flows have also a more intense innovative 
dynamics in terms of patents. Such positive association between PP and industries patenting 
activities is confirmed by the coefficient associated to the PP innovation propensity index. 
Interestingly, when the degree of import penetration on PP is taken into account, firstly it emerges 
that there is not a direct effect on innovation exerted by PP openness, suggesting that increasing 
international competition in PP does not spur innovative activities of domestic industries. On the 
contrary, in line with the hypothesis put forth above, a high degree of import penetration exerts a 
(negative) moderating effect on the PP-innovation relation, as testified by the coefficient associated 
to the PP-import penetration interaction term. No significant effects are registered with respect to 
the interaction between import penetration and the PP innovation propensity index.  
 
Table 3. Fixed effects Poisson estimations – Patents stock vs public procurement, innovative public procurement, 
import penetration, interaction term and controls (full sample model) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Export intensity (first lag) 0.00716*** 0.00672*** 0.00649*** 0.00549** 
	
(0.00162) (0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00205) 
Δ R&D expenditure (first lag) 0.0558 0.0526 0.106** 0.102*** 
	
(0.0492) (0.0493) (0.0331) (0.0308) 
Δ Public procurement (first lag) 
 
0.122*** 0.124*** 0.264*** 
	  
(0.0352) (0.0341) (0.0539) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index 
(first lag) 
  
0.0916** 0.113** 
	   
(0.0293) (0.0388) 
Import penetration on PP (first lag) 
   
0.000912 
	    
(0.000963) 
Δ Public procurement * import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.00304*** 
	    
(0.000770) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index* 
import penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.000534 
	    
(0.00105) 
Observations 6976 6974 6210 6210 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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According to the full sample model results, thus, PP exerts a significantly and strongly positive 
impact on industries innovative dynamics. In this respect, PP operates beside standard technology 
push (industries R&D expenditure) and demand-pull factors (exports) yet remaining strongly 
significant from a statistical point of view. Interestingly, no significant difference between PP and 
the PP innovation propensity index is registered. On the contrary, both variables have a strong 
association with the dynamics of patents. In turn, those industries facing a domestic public sector 
that relies comparatively more on foreign producers are characterized by a relatively weaker 
innovative dynamics in terms of patents.            
As discussed before, different approaches to PP as well as different degree of openness of PP to 
foreign producers may significantly impact on the public demand-innovation relation. Trying to 
capture potential heterogeneities between Europe and the other countries included in our sample – 
i.e. Japan, Korea, Russia, Turkey and the US -, we estimate the model in (3) on the sub-sample of 
European industries.12      
   
Table 4. Fixed effects Poisson estimations – Patents stock vs public procurement, innovative public procurement, 
import penetration, interaction term and controls (European economies only) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Export intensity (first lag) 0.00762*** 0.00721*** 0.00683*** 0.00532*** 
 
(0.00162) (0.00160) (0.00162) (0.00155) 
Δ R&D expenditure (first lag) 0.0432 0.0366 0.0360 0.0331 
 
(0.0286) (0.0278) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
Δ Public procurement (first lag) 
 
0.110*** 0.104*** 0.231*** 
  
(0.0269) (0.0253) (0.0378) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index (first 
lag) 
  
0.0678** 0.165*** 
   
(0.0257) (0.0431) 
Import penetration on PP (first lag) 
   
0.00159 
    
(0.00120) 
Δ Public procurement * import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.00232** 
    
(0.000754) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index* import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.00226* 
    
(0.000899) 
Observations 4881 4880 4880 4880 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   
 
																																								 																				
12	The countries included in this subsample are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (GER), 
Spain (SP), Finland (FIN), France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRE), Italy 
(IT), the Netherlands (NE), Poland (PO), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SV), Sweden (SWE) 
covering almost all the EU27 economy.	
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The European test shows both similarities and differences with respect to the full sample model. 
First of all, the positive relation between PP and industries innovation is confirmed. Even in 
Europe, industries facing relatively more intense PP flows are those showing a relatively larger 
patent stock. This result holds looking at both the general PP variable as well as the PP innovation 
propensity index. The major difference regards the role of import penetration on PP. Differently to 
the previous estimation, the moderating effect of import penetration is now detected with respect to 
both the interaction terms. This evidence suggests that a high degree of import penetration has a 
moderating (negative) effect on the PP-innovation nexus for both the European economies 
characterized by a public sector with a strong innovation propensity, as well as for those with a 
comparatively weaker innovation propensity. Regarding the other controls, the positive association 
between exports and patents is confirmed; while the same do not holds for the change in R&D 
intensity that, on the contrary, is always not significant.  
Overall, the test on European industries provides support to the hypothesis that PP is a key driver of 
industries innovation. This is true irrespectively from the variable used to measure PP. When it 
comes to import penetration, however, the latter seems to penalize the pro-innovative effect of 
public demand with respect to both PP and PP innovation propensity index. In this respect, the 
penalizing effect of import penetration on the PP-innovation nexus seems to operate in spite of the 
differences – in terms of governments’ relative innovation propensity - characterizing European 
economies.  
 
The role of industries technological heterogeneity 
As already argued, the relationship between PP and industries innovative dynamics may vary 
substantially according to industries technological characteristics. Following Pasinetti (1981) and 
Mazzucato (2016)’s insights, we test whether the association detected pooling all industries is 
reshaped when low and high-tech sectors are separately analyzed. The main hypothesis is that the 
positive association between PP and industries innovative activities is stronger for those sectors 
characterized by a relatively more intense use of knowledge and technology. The distinction 
between the two industry groups is made relying on the revised Pavitt taxonomy recently proposed 
by Bogliacino and Pianta (2016). Following the grouping based on this taxonomy and proposed in 
Guarascio et al. (2016), we include in the high-tech cluster the industries belonging to the Science 
Based (SB) and Supplier Specialized (SS) Pavitt’s groups – i.e. industries identified as those that 
more intensively rely on innovation. Contrarily, we include in the low-tech cluster the industries 
belonging to the Supplier Dominated (SD) and Scale Intensive (SI) groups. According to the Pavitt 
taxnomy’s rationale, SB and SS industries are characterized by a relatively more intense use of 
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knowledge and technology in their production process as compared to other sectors; rely mostly on 
high tech intermediate inputs; and their openness to the foreign market is also remarkable.        
 
Table 5. Fixed effects Poisson estimations – Patents stock vs public procurement, innovative public procurement, 
import penetration, interaction term and controls (Science Based and Specialized Supplier industries) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Export intensity (first lag) 0.00957** 0.00871** 0.00845** 0.00953* 
 
(0.00320) (0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00466) 
Δ R&D expenditure (first lag) -0.00204 -0.0235 0.284* 0.292** 
 
(0.200) (0.193) (0.118) (0.112) 
Δ Public procurement (first lag) 
 
0.237*** 0.216** 0.562*** 
  
(0.0714) (0.0722) (0.122) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index (first 
lag) 
  
0.142* 0.280* 
   
(0.0639) (0.120) 
Import penetration on PP (first lag) 
   
-0.000362 
    
(0.00238) 
Δ Public procurement * import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.00733*** 
    
(0.00215) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index* import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.00344 
    
(0.00225) 
Observations 1591 1591 1415 1415 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   
 
Conversely, SI and SD industries are characterized by a comparatively lower propensity towards 
innovation and by an intensive use of low tech inputs originating principally from the domestic 
market. The full list of industries included in the Bogliacino and Pianta (2016)’s revised Pavitt 
taxonomy is reported in the Appendix. 
The test on high tech industries (table 5) displays a picture that significantly overlaps what emerged 
estimating the full sample model (table 3). As before, industries patenting activities seems to be 
supported by both technology-push and demand-pull drivers. Looking at columns (3) and (4), in 
fact, it can be noted that the variables capturing industries export intensity and R&D efforts are both 
positively and significantly associated with the dynamics of patents. As expected, PP has a strong 
impact on SB and SS’ industries’ patents stock. Contrarily, the PP innovation propensity index 
shows a weaker (albeit positive) statistical association with the dependent variable. Remarkably, the 
moderating effect of import penetration affects also the sub-cluster of high-tech industries: sign and 
significance of the coefficient associated with the PP-import penetration interaction term (column 4) 
points to a  negative and significant moderating effect of import penetration.     
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Table 6. Fixed effects Poisson estimations – Patents stock vs public procurement, innovative public procurement, 
import penetration, interaction term and controls (Scale Intensive and Supplier Dominated industries) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Export intensity (first lag) 0.00526*** 0.00496** 0.00456** 0.00321 
 
(0.00153) (0.00151) (0.00162) (0.00193) 
Δ R&D expenditure (first lag) 0.0683* 0.0674* 0.0689* 0.0670* 
 
(0.0286) (0.0295) (0.0313) (0.0292) 
Δ Public procurement (first lag) 
 
0.0830* 0.0894** 0.195*** 
  
(0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0448) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index (first 
lag) 
  
0.0767* 0.0890* 
   
(0.0320) (0.0407) 
Import penetration on PP (first lag) 
   
0.00136 
    
(0.000911) 
Δ Public procurement * import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.00230** 
    
(0.000714) 
Δ PP Innovation propensity Index* import 
penetration (first lag) 
   
-0.000342 
    
(0.00123) 
Observations 5385 5383 4795 4795 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   
The final test regards low-tech industries (table 6). The relevance of R&D efforts and exports as 
explanatory factors is almost confirmed. Interestingly enough, the variable capturing industries 
export intensity lose significance when the model is fully specified (column 4). This finding is in 
line with the comparatively lower degree of internationalization characterizing this group of sectors 
as opposed to the SB and SS ones. Moving to the role of PP, the latter exerts its positive and 
significant impact on patents also in SD and SI industries. This result is particularly important since 
it points to a potential ‘upgrading effect’ of PP. That is, the presence of relevant PP flows seems to 
stimulate the development of innovations even in industries traditionally less prone to this kind of 
activities. In this sense, one may argue that a large-scale and well targeted PP can not only work on 
the ‘intensive margin’ – i.e. pushing innovative activities of those industries that are already 
characterized by the introduction of new products, new processes and patents; but also on the 
extensive one – i.e. favoring the upgrading of low-tech industries and the diffusion of innovative 
activities among firms populating the SD and SI groups. The moderating effect of import 
penetration, finally, seems to be stronger also for low-tech industries.   
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4. Conclusions 
Nine years after the explosion of the 2008 crisis, industrial policy is coming back to the fore as a 
key action to promote growth and development. This revival interrupts thirty years or radical 
neglect, at least if industrial policy is intended as direct and selective interventions aimed at creating 
and steering new productions and markets (Chang and Andreoni, 2016; Mazzucato, 2016). A set of 
‘old-style’ industrial policy instruments are now back in the policy makers toolbox to spur firms, 
industries and, ultimately, countries long-term growth. Among these instruments, a pivotal role is 
played by public procurement, largely recognized as a powerful driver of technological upgrading 
and industrial renewal (Edquist, 2015).  
This work fills a gap in the empirical literature by analysing the impact of PP on industries’ 
patenting activities for 24 countries over the period 1995-2011. Enriching a largely qualitative 
literature, this analysis provides a quantitative account of the role of PP as innovation driver. In 
addition, the relationship between PP and innovation is studied taking into consideration the 
potentially moderating effect of import penetration of PP. Finally, in order to capture the role of 
both institutional and technological heterogeneity, the analysis is replicated on three industry-level 
subsamples. By limiting the estimation to European industries, we firstly test whether institutional 
differences – i.e. in particular, differences concerning the degree of openness of domestic PP to 
foreign producers - dividing Europe and the other countries included in the sample – i.e. Japan, 
Korea, Russia, Turkey and the US – affects magnitude and shape of the investigated relations. 
Second, we separately analyse high and low-tech sectors so to verify if the effect of PP on patents 
changes depending on industries technological characteristics.  
The main results can be summarized as follows. First of all, PP emerges as a strong innovation 
driver. All across the estimations, a positive and strongly significant association between PP and 
industries’ patenting activities is detected. This is true for both the ‘regular’ PP indicator as well as 
for the PP innovation propensity index – i.e. the index that weights industries’ PP by the country-
level share of public expenditure devoted to R&D activities. Remarkably, such association is 
significant despite controlling for technology-push and demand-pull factors such as R&D 
expenditure and exports. In this respect, PP is identified as an element exerting an additional and 
positive effect on industries innovativeness summing up over the other traditional technology-push 
and demand-pull drivers.  
The second finding regards the role of import penetration. Confirming the expectations, industries 
displaying a relatively stronger import penetration are characterized by a significant reduction in the 
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pro-innovative effect of PP, as testified, in all the estimations, by the negative sign of the coefficient 
of the PP-import penetration interaction term.  
The test on European industries provides some additional insights. The positive impact of PP on 
patents emerging from the baseline estimation is confirmed. Such positive effect is detected 
irrespectively from the variable used to measure PP. The key difference, however, regards import 
penetration. In the European case, the moderating effect of import penetration operates for both the 
regular and for the ‘innovation augmented’ PP differently to the baseline case where only the 
regular PP-import penetration interaction resulted negative and significant. In Europe, thus, an 
excessive openness to foreign competition seems to negatively affect the innovation spurring effect 
of PP in spite of the heterogeneous innovation propensity characterizing EU member states’ 
governments. From this point of view, these findings seems to support the recent President 
Macron’s proposal regarding the adoption of a ‘Buy Europe’ Act analogous to the one launched in 
the US after the 2008 crisis.13 Such proposal, in fact, recognizes that in order to maximize PP-
related economic and technological benefits EU economies should properly calibrate procurement’s 
degree of openness.      
Finally, the relationship between PP and industries patents stock is not significantly altered when 
high and low tech industries are separately taken into account. In the high-tech case, the results 
strongly overlap what emerged estimating the full sample model. When it comes to low-tech 
industries, PP is again identified as a powerful innovation driver. This result reveals the PP’s 
capacity to stimulate a process of technological upgrading in sectors traditionally less prone to the 
introduction of innovations. The moderating effect of import penetration, in turn, seems to operate 
in both the high and the low-tech cluster.  
In terms of policy implications, this work provides a strong claim in favour of PP as a crucial 
instrument to spur innovativeness and to favour industrial renewal and technological upgrading. In 
this sense, this study strengthen the arguments put forth by the qualitative literature emphasizing the 
pro-innovative stance of PP. Moreover, the findings on the moderating effect of import penetration 
suggest that decisions concerning the degree of openness of PP should be carefully undertaken 
avoiding any penalization of the PP pro-innovative effects.     
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6. Appendix 
Matching patent data and industrial classifications  
The concordance system proposed by Lybbert and Zolas (2014) rely on data mining methods and 
probabilistic matching allowing to create direct linkages between patent data and a variety of 
economic classification schemes. Using the Algorithmic Links with Probabilities (ALP) approach, 
country-level information on patents are examined identifying relevant keywords extracted from 
industry classification descriptions. The search is performed using patent titles and abstracts. Then, 
patents are tabulated by IPC code, and frequency matches between the industry-level classification 
– i.e. NACE - and IPC classifications are performed. By analysing these frequencies, IPC and 
industrial classification are finally matched.  
The patents assigned for each year to the specific sector/country combination are used to compute 
the patent stock as a measure of the installed technological capability at the sector level. The 
‘depreciation’ of the stock is than taken into account by applying a standard decay rate. Formally, 
the procedure adopted to build the patent stock can be expressed as follows (4): 
 𝐾𝑃𝐴𝑇!,! = 𝑃𝐴𝑇!,!𝑒 !! !!!!!!!  (4) 
 
where 𝑃𝐴𝑇!,!  represents the number of patents applied in country i in year s where s represents an 
index of years up to and including year t, whereas µ is the decay rate, here assumed as a standard 
15% value. 
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The revised Pavitt taxonomy 
The separate test on high and low-tech sectors is performed relying on the revised Pavitt taxonomy 
proposed by Bogliacino and Pianta (2016). The following table reports the list of sectors divided by 
Pavitt class and according to the HT (Science Based and Specialized Suppliers) – LT (Supplier 
Dominated and Scale Intensive) grouping used for the econometric analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. The classification of sectors adopted for the HT – LT test 
 SECTORS (NACE Rev.1) Nace Codes 
 
Pavitt class High (HT) 
and Low 
(LT) 
technology 
sectors* 
Nr. MANUFACTURING    
1 FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 15 - 16 SD LT 
2 TEXTILES 17 SD LT 
3 WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING AND DYEING 18 SD LT 
4 LEATHER, LEATHER PRODUCTS AND FOOTWEAR 19 SD LT 
5 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 20 SD LT 
6 PULP, PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 21 SI LT 
7 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 22 SI LT 
8 CHEMICAL AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 24 SB HT 
9 RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 25 SI LT 
10 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 26 SI LT 
11 BASIC METALS 27 SI LT 
12 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS (EXCEPT MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT) 28 SD LT 
13 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, NEC 29 SB HT 
14 OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY 30 SB HT 
15 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC 31 SS HT 
16 RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 32 SB HT 
17 MEDICAL PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 33 SB HT 
18 MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMITRAILERS 34 SI LT 
19 OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 35 SS HT 
20 MANUFACTURING NEC AND RECYCLING 36 SD LT 
* The high and low-tech classification is made relying on the revised Pavitt taxonomy for manufacturing and services (Bogliacino 
and Pianta, 2016). Industries belonging to the Science Based (SB) and Supplier Specialized (SS) are included in the high-tech group 
while Supplier Dominated (SD) and Scale Intensive (SI) in the low-tech one. We include in the low-tech group also the following 
Supplier Dominated service sectors: inland transport (61), water transport (62), air transport (63) and transport auxiliary activities 
(64); as well as the agricultural and haunting (AtB), mining (C), electricity and gas (E) and the construction (F) sectors.      
 
 
